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Abstract 
While the Eurosystem has considerably improved its operational transparency in 
the last few years, it is still lagging the Federal Reserve System (Fed), especially 
in terms of the information it provides on operating costs and staff numbers, for 
which it provides very scarce data. In addition, the available information is 
scattered throughout different publications, rather than being presented in a user-
friendly fashion. Compared to the Fed, the Eurosystem seems to have higher staff 
numbers and operational costs for similar tasks. Also because of the Treaty 
requirement to implement monetary policy in a decentralised way, the 
Eurosystem’s implementation of monetary policy is fairly complex. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper assesses the decentralised implementation of monetary policy by the Eurosystem 
in terms of its transparency, efficiency and simplicity.  
We assume that the efficacy of the Eurosystem is independent of the analysed characteristics. 
On operational transparency: 
• Transparency is a core issue for independent central banks. 
• The European Central Bank has become considerably more transparent in the last few 
years. 
• Information is often provided in user-unfriendly ways. 
• The Fed is generally more transparent than the Eurosystem. 
• The reasons behind different levels of transparency in different operations are not 
clear. 
On efficiency: 
• Efficiency is measured in operational costs. We assume no connection between the 
efficiency and efficacy of the Eurosystem. 
• The Eurosystem has aggregate operational costs close to €10 billion, of which close 
to €1 billion is for the ECB (in 2016). 
• The total staff size of the Eurosystem and the ECB amounts to over 48,000 and 3,100 
units respectively.   
• The Fed employs around half this number of persons. 
• Rough estimates of the cost of the monetary policy function are also higher for the 
Eurosystem than for the Fed. 
On simplicity: 
• The Eurosystem implements its main monetary policies – liquidity management and 
quantitative easing – in a decentralised way, which is intrinsically complex. 
• For the asset purchases, the Eurosystem does not disclose the criteria behind the 
different implementation modalities of the different programmes.  
Our paper concludes with a number of recommendations. 
Regarding transparency, we suggest that the Eurosystem/ECB should: 
• Disclose more information on monetary operations. If this contains sensitive material, 
a delay would be appropriate. 
• Disclose more information on operational costs and staff headcounts. 
• Publish annual reports on costs in a standardised form. 
• Collect data about its own operations at a single point (preferably the ECB). 
Regarding efficiency, we suggest that the Eurosystem should: 
• Continue to reduce costs, which implies that the reduction of staff numbers that it has 
pursued over the last few years should continue. 
Regarding simplicity, we suggest that the Eurosystem/ECB should: 
• Disclose information on how decisions on implementation are made. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
This paper answers a request by the Services of the European Parliament to assess the 
decentralised implementation of monetary policy by the Eurosystem, which is composed of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the euro area, 
with particular regard to: 
• Transparency 
• Efficiency  
• Simplicity. 
This paper does not address the issue of the efficacy of the Eurosystem, i.e. its ability to 
achieve its target. Two assumptions underlie this paper: first, efficacy can be achieved with 
different levels of efficiency, i.e. with the use of different amounts of resources; second, the 
efficacy in achieving statutory objectives is comparable between the ECB and the Fed. 
As requested, this paper concentrates on the monetary policy function of the Eurosystem and 
excludes its supervisory role. However, because of data limitations, strong and inevitably 
rough, assumptions are needed to separate the monetary policy function from the 
supervisory function. When appropriate, this paper will compare the experience of the 
Eurosystem with that of the Fed, even if we are aware of the limits of this comparison, 
because the two central banks do not have exactly the same tasks. 
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 TRANSPARENCY 
The combination of central bank independence and accountability is a delicate issue and 
transparency plays a crucial role in achieving the appropriate design. Transparency is the 
tool through which the central bank opens its books to public opinion and to the different 
institutions to which it is accountable but on which it is not dependent. The issue is even 
more complex in a multi-jurisdictional set-up like the euro area.  
The concept of transparency used in this paper is different from that used by Geraats (2001) 
and Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). We analyse the “...kind of operational transparency” 
consisting of “the publication of money market interventions that are made to implement 
policy decisions.” rather than the “...transparency ... included in our transparency index 
which focuses more on macroeconomic aspects.”1.  
The importance of transparency has become more relevant because the ECB had to take on 
additional responsibilities during the Great Recession. Three issues are particularly relevant 
in this respect: 
1. The objective of financial stability, which was implicitly included in that of price 
stability until the beginning of the Great Recession, started to vie for the first position 
in the hierarchy of objectives of the central bank, potentially creating dilemmas for 
monetary policy; 
2. The borders between fiscal and monetary policies were blurred because the ECB was 
forced to embark, like other central banks in advanced economies, on forceful QE to 
regain price stability; 
3. The ECB had to take on the responsibility of assuring the survival of the euro, given 
the late and insufficient actions of euro-area governments. 
When assessing the transparency of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy, we can make some 
general remarks: 
1. Considerable progress has been made over the recent past. 
2. The level of transparency of different types of monetary operations is very different. 
3. Overall, the transparency of the Eurosystem is lower than that of the Fed, although 
there are areas over which the ECB is more transparent. 
4. Although there are good reasons for different levels of transparency for different 
operations, the specific reasons behind the actual levels of transparency 
characterising different operations are not always clear. 
5. Reporting on efficiency issues is very limited in the Eurosystem. 
The above-mentioned points are illustrated in turn. 
2.1. Recent improvements 
Considerable progress has been made over the recent past on transparency. 
The most important step towards greater transparency has been the publication of the so-
called Monetary Policy Account since February 2015, though, as Table 1 shows, there have 
also been other steps.  
                                           
1  Eijfinger and Geraats (2006) make this point in footnote 4 of their paper. 
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Table 1: Monetary policy implementation: selected transparency 
enhancements 
Measure Information provided Since 
TARGET21 balances Outstanding amounts per NCB 11/2011* 
ELA2 ELA procedures 11/2013** 
Monetary Policy Account Governing Council’s monetary policy 
discussions 
02/2015 
Board member diaries Meetings 11/2015 
ANFA3 FAQ on ANFA 02/2016 
ANFA amounts Eurosystem disaggregated balance sheet data 07/2016 
ELA ELA Agreement 06/2017 
Source: ECB Website. 
Notes: 1: TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer system) is the real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) system owned and operated by the Eurosystem; 2: Emergency Liquidity Assistance; 
3: Agreement on Net Financial Assets; * Some NCBs already published TARGET2 balances in their balance sheets 
before the indicated date, but this information was not disclosed in a clear manner; ** The ECB had already published 
some procedural information in its Monthly Bulletin. 
2.2. Varying levels of transparency 
The level of transparency of the different types of monetary operations is very different. 
Table 2 summarises the information disclosed about various monetary instruments and 
shows, for most items, the comparable situation for the Fed. 
As Table 2 suggests, for certain operations, such as liquidity management, the ECB provides 
a good level of transparency, but transparency is limited when reporting on other operations 
(e.g. management of foreign reserves and own funds).  
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Table 2: Information provided by the ECB and the Fed for different types of 
operations 
 Operation 
name 
Current 
aggregate 
holdings 
List of assets 
held 
Amount 
per 
asset 
C.p. named 
Quantitative 
Easing 
ECB 
(APPa) 
CBPP3a1     
ABSPPa2     
PSPPa3  3   
CSPPa4  2   
Fed 
(LSAPb) 
Agency MBS  1 1 1 
Treasuries  1 1 1 
 Operation 
name 
Total amount per 
operation 
Total amount 
per 
jurisdiction 
Total 
number 
of c.p. 
C.p. 
named 
Amount 
per c.p. 
Liquidity 
Management 
ECB 
MROc  3    
LTROd  3    
TLTROe  3    
Fed REPOf      
 Operation 
name 
Current 
outstanding 
amounts 
Total amount 
per operation 
Total 
number 
of c.p. 
C.p. 
named 
Amount 
per c.p. 
Lending of 
Last Resort 
ECB ELA 4     
Fed Discount Window 
 1 1 1 1 
  
Full list of 
eligible 
assets 
Eligible 
marketable 
assets total 
amount  
Use of 
collateral 
Average outstanding credit 
Peak outstanding credit 
Collateral ECB  
 per type of asset   
  Total amount … per type of asset … per country 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserves  
ECB    
Own Funds ECB  5  
ANFA ECB    
Source: Websites of the ECB, the euro area NCBs, the FOMC, and the Fed New York; own illustration. 
Notes:  The colours of the cells indicate the level of information from full to no disclosure: green - yellow - orange 
- red. 
c.p. Counterparty 
a Asset Purchase Programme 
a1 Covered bond purchase programme 3 
a2 Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme 
a3 Public Sector Purchase Programme 
a4 Corporate Sector Purchase Programme 
b Large Securities Asset Purchases 
c Main refinancing operations  
d Longer-term refinancing operations 
e Targeted longer-term refinancing operations 
f Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements  
1 Complete Transaction log is disclosed per quarter two years after operation. 
2 Information provided by the ECB. 
3 Information provided decentralised by the NCBs. 
4 The NCBs that have provided ELA in the past have usually disclosed such information with a 
lag, e.g. in their annual reports. No reporting from the ECB. 
5 Only three broad types of assets are provided 
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Quantitative Easing 
For all programmes, total purchased amounts are provided. For the CSPP, the ECB publishes 
the list of the specific bonds (ISIN) purchased; for the PSPP this information is given by the 
NCBs and the ECB. In both cases, the Eurosystem does not disclose the amount invested in 
a specific asset, but only the name of the asset. By contrast, the Fed discloses a complete 
log of its operations after a two-year interval, revealing the amounts of individual assets 
purchased, as well as current holdings on asset level via the System Open Market Account 
Holding (SOMA). 
Liquidity Management 
Aggregate amounts and the number of counterparties are published by the ECB for liquidity 
management operations (MRO, LTRO, TLTRO). However, exhaustive information about the 
operations per jurisdiction is not provided by the ECB but only by the NCBs, making it quite 
user-unfriendly. In the ECB Financial Integration Report statistical annex, a breakdown 
between ‘Group A’ and ‘Group B’ countries is provided per operation but only for current 
accounts and the deposit facility. The new monthly disaggregated NCB balance sheet provides 
snapshot data for MRO, LTRO and TLTRO. Information about the banks involved is not 
provided. 
Lending of Last Resort 
The ECB does not disclose any information on ELA amounts. As seen in Table 1, the ECB has 
published the ‘Agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (June 2017), which states that 
NCBs have the option but not the obligation to disclose information about ELA operations. 
NCBs usually give information on ELA amounts in their annual reports, but this is not easy to 
aggregate at euro-area level. The Fed discloses current and past aggregate amounts of 
discount window lending, while detailed, disaggregated information (including amounts, 
conditions, name of the bank) is disclosed after a delay of two years. 
Collateral 
The ECB publishes quite extensive information on the collateral that can be used (full list of 
eligible marketable assets) for refinancing operations and the rules for its use. In terms of 
the actual use of collateral, the ECB publishes quarterly amounts per type of asset. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves and Own Funds 
On a monthly basis, the ECB publishes on its website a breakdown of its foreign reserves, in 
particular the split between securities and deposits, but no further details. In the annual 
report there is a breakdown per currency and information about off-balance sheet 
instruments. The ECB also provides on some occasions more information about the 
investment process. However, while the ECB states in its annual report that “this portfolio is 
invested in euro-denominated assets with the objective of maximising returns, subject to the 
limits imposed in terms of risk,” no information on either return or risk is provided.  
ANFA (Agreement on Net Financial Assets) 
The ECB discloses the total amount subject to ANFA and a breakdown into countries, but no 
information about the purchased assets nor about risk and return results.  
2.3. The transparency of the Fed 
Overall, the Eurosystem is less transparent than the Fed. 
Table 2 shows that, as a consequence of the Dodd-Frank Act, overall the Fed publishes, albeit 
with a delay, more information about its operations than the Eurosystem, though for some 
operations the ECB publishes more information. 
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2.4. The reasons for (lack of) transparency 
While there are good reasons for different operations to have different levels of transparency, 
the specific reasons behind the actual levels of transparency maintained by the Eurosystem 
are not always clear. 
Quantitative Easing 
As we have noted, the ECB’s reporting on its Asset Purchase Programme is quite extensive. 
However, it is not clear why the level of transparency differs between the programmes and 
why not all information could be disclosed by the ECB after some time interval, as the Fed 
does. 
Liquidity management 
As mentioned, information about liquidity management operations is quite detailed, but is 
not easily available per jurisdiction and per bank because country-level data is only provided 
by the NCBs. Not giving information per bank is justified, because it could stigmatise 
individual banks (see below). However, the justification for not giving systematic information 
for jurisdictions is no longer valid because of the diversified situation in different countries 
after the beginning of the Great Recession. 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
Limiting information on Lending of Last Resort is justified, as the negative experience of the 
Fed shows. The discount window was for many years considered as a last-resort source of 
central bank liquidity and borrowing from this facility was seen as a sign of financial 
weakness. This created a persistent ‘stigma’ problem, which the Fed’s repeated efforts could 
not eliminate. The fact that banks even paid higher rates than those applied to the discount 
window in order to not borrow under this facility caused problems for the orderly functioning 
of the money market. The stigma problem has been much less pervasive in the euro area, 
but extensive and timely information on ELA borrowing could aggravate it. Nevertheless, the 
ECB could disclose information after a delay. 
Foreign reserves, own funds, ANFA 
It is not clear why the ECB does not provide more information about its foreign exchange 
reserves and how it invests its own funds. It is also not clear why so little information is given 
about NCBs’ ANFA investments. The limited amount of information that was eventually 
provided (see Table 2) was only issued after the quasi-secret nature of the purchases gave 
rise to dangerous confusion between monetary policy and investment operations2. 
2.5. Transparency of costs and staff 
Reporting on efficiency issues is very limited in the Eurosystem. 
The last point about transparency is a bridge to the issue of efficiency. The Eurosystem is not 
transparent about its use of resources. The Fed publishes in its nearly 500-page annual report 
very detailed information about the cost of central banking and about staff headcounts. By 
contrast, because of the limited information provided by the Eurosystem, external observers 
have to use unavoidably rough estimates to get a sense of the efficiency of the Eurosystem, 
as section 3 shows.  
 
                                           
2  For further details on that debate see Papadia (2015). 
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 EFFICIENCY 
This section, in effect, tries to answer the question of how much the euro area pays for the 
monetary policy services provided by the Eurosystem. When discussing the cost of central 
banking and of public services in general, the emphasis is on staff numbers and operational 
expenses, which define the predominant part of central bank costs.  
3.1. The total operational cost of the Eurosystem 
The total functioning cost of the ECB, covering all its functions, amounted to €953.8 million 
in 20163, out of which €466.5 million, i.e. close to 50 percent, is related to staff costs.4 The 
total functioning costs of the Eurosystem (ECB and 19 NCBs) add up to €9,932.6 million, out 
of which €6,254.9 million (63 percent) is for personnel. The remaining expenses are 
administrative, depreciation, banknote production and other operating costs. 
3.2. Staff size of the Eurosystem 
The ECB employed 3,171 people in 20165 (plus 250 seconded employees), while the entire 
Eurosystem employed 48,557 persons6. The NCBs with the largest headcounts are the 
Banque de France (11,690), the Deutsche Bundesbank (9,775) and the Banca d'Italia 
(6,885). Table 3 provides an overview of the cost and staff size of the Eurosystem. The table 
also shows that the Eurosystem’s staff headcount is twice that of the Fed. As staff costs make 
up a substantial part of total costs, the Eurosystem’s total costs are also more than twice 
those of the Fed. 
Table 3: Staff headcounts and operating costs of the Eurosystem and the Fed 
Eurosystem  Staff Total operating costs (in € millions) 
ECB 3,171 953.8 
Austria 1,092 425.1 
Belgium 2,197 413.4 
Cyprus n/a 43.4 
Estonia 231 17.7 
Finland 376 99.7 
France 11,690 2,192.0 
Germany 9,775 1,811.0 
Greece 1,854 331.7 
Ireland 1,599 233.4 
Italy 6,885 2,042.2 
Latvia 539 39.4 
Lithuania 588 36.3 
Luxembourg 346 81.3 
Malta 326 18.1 
Netherlands 1,703 389.0 
Portugal 1,797 198.3 
Slovakia 1,075 82.2 
Slovenia 448 33.1 
Spain 2,865 491.4 
Total euro area 48,557 9,932.6 
                                           
3  Comprises staff costs (including pension plans), administrative expenses, depreciations, and banknote 
production services. 
4  Including pensions plans, other post-employment benefits, and other long-term benefits. 
5  Measured in full-time equivalent units. 
6  No employment figures of the Central Bank of Cyprus were found and the last available ones for the Central 
Bank of Greece are from 2014. 
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Federal Reserve System Staff Total operating costs (in € millions of 20167) 
Board of Governors (including Office of 
Inspector General) 2,919 650.4 ($719.8 million) 
Reserve Banks (including currency) 19,330 4,277.1 ($4,732.8 million) 
 Total USA 22,249 4,927.9 ($ 5,452.6 million) 
Source: ECB Annual report, NCBs’ Annual reports, Fed Annual Report (all of 2016).  
Table 3 shows a clear correlation between staff size and country populations (see also Figure 
1). This suggests that the large staff size of the Eurosystem (compared to the Fed) is not 
primarily driven by certain outlying, relatively larger NCBs. However, Figure 1 shows that 
there are some NCBs (e.g. in France, Ireland and Belgium), which are relatively larger and 
some (e.g. Estonia and Spain) which are relatively smaller, compared to their populations. 
Figure 1 also shows that the Eurosystem has a greater headcount than the Fed, given similar 
populations of the euro area and the US. The results largely hold true also using GDP per 
country instead of population, or total operating expenses instead of staff size.  
Figure 1:  Population and NCB headcounts (2016) 
 
Source: ECB and NCBs’ websites; Fed Annual Report (2016); World Bank. 
Notes: Both axes are shown in a logarithmic scale. 
Table 3 shows that the ECB has a staff size very close to that of the Board of the Fed and, in 
the Eurosystem, to that of the Banco de España. However, the total costs of the ECB are 
higher than those of the Board of the Fed or Spain’s central bank, but less than half of those 
of the NCBs of Germany, France and Italy. 
The total size of the Eurosystem has come down substantially since its founding in 1998. In 
that year the ECB employed 2,637 persons fewer than in 2016 but the Banque de France, 
the Bundesbank, the Banca d’Italia and the Banco de España8 employed respectively 2,578, 
4,683, 2,030 and 283 more employees than in 2017.9 Using these banks as an imperfect 
proxy, the entire Eurosystem‘s headcount has been reduced by 16.8 percent (6,937 units) 
since 1998. 
                                           
7  Taking an average 2016 conversion rate of 0.90372 €/$. 
8  Figures of 1999. 
9  If available, numbers are presented in full-time equivalent employees. 
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3.3. Monetary policy: staffing and costs 
The figures reported above are for total central banking costs, including those of supervision. 
Unfortunately, neither the ECB nor the NCBs publish breakdowns of costs and staff per 
function. To shed some light on the specific question on the monetary policy function 
addressed by this paper, one is therefore forced to use unavoidably rough methods. 
The first method, which can define the upper range of the estimates, starts from three strong 
assumptions: first, central bank staff are dedicated, directly or indirectly, either to 
supervision or to monetary policy; second, the share of costs deriving from monetary policy 
is the same as the share of the staff dedicated to this function; third, the split between the 
costs and staff dedicated to monetary policy and supervision is the same at the ECB and at 
the NCBs. Since the ECB reports operational costs for supervision, we can obtain those 
deriving from monetary policy as a residual (€572.3 million), corresponding to 60 percent of 
the total, which is taken as an, upward biased, indicator of the share of the cost of monetary 
policy and of the staff dedicated to monetary policy at the ECB. Applying this same 
percentage to the entire Eurosystem, we end up with estimates of close to €6 billion spent 
by the Eurosystem on monetary policy (Table 4) and of more than 29,000 employees working 
on monetary policy in the entire Eurosystem. 
The second method, which can define the lower range of the estimates, assumes that the 
split between monetary policy and other functions in the Eurosystem is the same as for the 
Fed. The very fine organisational details about the ‘costs’ of central banking given in the Fed’s 
Annual Report state that 12.7 percent10 of the Fed’s operating costs pertain to monetary 
policy (which clearly covers a much narrower definition than the residual one implicit in the 
first method), while supervision accounted for 24 percent. Using this much lower percentage 
than the one used in the first method, we get an estimate of €1,261.4 million in costs and 
6,167 employees dedicated to monetary policy at the Eurosystem. This is also, obviously 
given that the total operational costs of the Eurosystem are considerably higher than those 
of the Fed, much higher than the figures reported by the Fed for its monetary policy staff 
and costs (€625.6 million)10. Thus, both the upper and the lower range of the estimates of 
the Eurosystem costs for the monetary policy function are higher than those of the Fed. Table 
4 reports the relevant estimates. 
Table 4: Eurosystem monetary policy costs 
 Staff headcount Operational costs  [in € millions] 
… in basis 
points11 
ECB total  3,171 (100%) 953.8 (100%)  
… supervision 1268 (40%) 382.1 (40%)  
… monetary policy (method 1) 1902 (60%) 572.3 (60%)  0.53 
… monetary policy (method 2) 403 (12.7%) 121.1 (12.7%) 0.11     
Eurosystem total 48,557 (100%) 9,932.6 (100%)  
… monetary policy (method 1) 29,134 (60%) 5,959.6 (60%)  5.55 
… monetary policy (method 2) 6,167 (12.7%) 1,261.4 (12.7%) 1.18 
Source: ECB Annual Report; Fed Annual Report (all of 2016). 
Notes: Figures in italics are estimates. 
In order to have a sense of the figures in Table 4, it is useful to report them in a measurement 
unit different from the euro. In terms of total GDP of the euro area, the cost of the monetary 
policy function at the ECB and at the Eurosystem is 0.53 BPS (basis points) and 5.55 BPS 
respectively for method 1, and 0.11 BPS and 1.18 BPS respectively for method 2.  
                                           
10  Entails €592 million ($655.1 million) by the Federal Reserve Banks (“monetary and economic policy”) and 
€33.6 million ($37.2 million) by the Board of Governors (“monetary affairs”). 
11  GDP of euro area in 2016: €10,730,473 million. 
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In terms of the operating costs of a commercial bank, the costs of the ECB for monetary 
policy (method 1) are comparable to the operating expenses of a medium sized bank such 
as the Hamburger Sparkasse AG. The costs of the Eurosystem are comparable to the 
operating expenses of a large bank like UniCredit. 
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 SIMPLICITY 
The ECB states that “simplicity [...] ensure[s] that the intentions behind monetary policy 
operations are correctly understood” (ECB, 2017b), but the decentralised structure of the 
Eurosystem inevitably complicates its operations. In this section, we illustrate this point with 
two examples. 
4.1. Liquidity management 
Figure 2 depicts the information and operational flows between the ECB and the NCBs in the 
implementation of the liquidity providing operations. The ECB makes the announcement and 
the relevant information is spread by the ECB and the NCBs to banks and the public. After 
that, the NCBs collect the bids from the banks and pass them on to the ECB. The decision 
about the allotment is then taken and made public by the ECB. The settlement of payments 
is done between the private banks and the NCBs using the TARGET2 system.  
Figure 2: Implementation of liquidity providing operations by the ECB 
 
Source: ECB Guidelines on the implementation of monetary policy; own illustration. 
4.2. Quantitive Easing 
The implementation of Quantitative Easing is more complex at the Eurosystem than at the 
Fed (Figure 3)12. Within the Fed, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) makes the 
decisions and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts all operations.  
  
                                           
12  See for a more complete description of the ECB’s quantitative easing in Claeys, Leandro and Mandra (2015). 
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Figure 3:  Comparison of asset purchase programme implementation 
 
Source:  ECB (2014); Website of the ECB; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016); own 
illustration. 
In the Eurosystem, the Governing Council of the ECB takes the decisions and the ECB 
coordinates the actions, but operations are mostly implemented by NCBs. The 
implementation of asset purchases even differs between different programmes within the 
asset purchase programme. As described in Table 5, purchases are either delegated to a 
selected number of NCBs and to the ECB, or shared based on capital subscriptions. Regarding 
the CSPP and the ABSPP, it is not entirely clear which criteria are used to choose the 
implementing NCBs and their geographical coverage. 
Overall, it can be concluded that monetary policy is implemented in a decentralised way in 
the Eurosystem at the expense of simplicity. 
However, in reaching this conclusion, three factors must be taken into account: 
1. The decentralised approach is required by the Treaty (Article 12.1 of the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank);  
2. The extensive use of information technology reduces the problems of a decentralised 
approach; 
3. NCBs have certain advantages in dealing with local counterparties, e.g. in terms of 
language and local market knowledge. Nevertheless, some simplification could be 
achieved, in particular in the area of asset purchases, where clearer criteria of 
specialisation could be used. 
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Table 5: APP implementation in the Eurosystem 
Program  Implementing Institution Geographical Coverage 
CSPP 
Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de 
Belgique 
BE, CY, GR, LU, MT, PT, 
NL****, SI and SK 
Deutsche Bundesbank DE and NL* 
Banco de España ES and NL** 
Suomen Pankki/Finlands Bank AT, EE, FI, IE, LT, LV 
Banque de France FR 
Banca d’Italia IT and NL*** 
PSPP All Eurosystem NCBs and ECB based on the capital key NCB’s home market 
ABSPP ˟ 
Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de 
Belgique BE 
Deutsche Bundesbank DE 
Banco de España ES 
Banque de France FI, FR, IE, LU, and PT 
Banca d’Italia IT 
De Nederlandsche Bank NL 
CBPP3 Purchases by the ECB and the NCBs 0 n/a 
Sources: ECB (2014); Website of the ECB. 
Notes: 
*  Includes bonds of issuers with NL as residence country and DE as country of risk. 
**  Includes bonds of issuers with NL as residence country and ES as country of risk. 
*** Includes bonds of issuers with NL as residence country and IT as country of risk. 
**** Includes bonds of issuers with NL as residence country and a country of risk other  
 than DE, ES and IT. 
˟ Other markets will only be explicitly allocated in case of eligible issuance. 
0 No further information on implementation is provided by the ECB or the NCBs. 
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 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
On transparency: 
1. The ECB has considerably increased the transparency of its implementation of 
monetary policy over the last few years; 
2. The information is often published in unsystematic and user-unfriendly ways; 
3. Overall, the ECB is less transparent than the Fed; 
4. More information should be provided on so called ANFA operations as well as on the 
investment of foreign reserves and the ECB own funds; 
5. The ECB should have more recourse to the practice of publishing information after an 
appropriate delay; this should particularly apply to information about Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance and possibly to asset purchases; 
6. The ECB should provide exhaustive information on the country breakdown of its 
liquidity management operations;  
7. The Eurosystem should be much more open and precise about its costs and the staff 
employed to carry out its different functions. In particular the Eurosystem could 
implement a data collection system similar to that of Eurostat, where NCBs would 
report to the ECB data on monetary policy and their own operations (costs and staff) 
in a standardised manner.  
On efficiency: 
1. Any assessment of the efficiency of the system is severely impaired by the lack of 
information provided by the Eurosystem on its costs and staffing levels; 
2. The Eurosystem has made progress towards efficiency by reducing its total headcount 
by an estimate of around 17 percent since its creation; 
3. Still, the Eurosystem is much larger than the Fed and more progress seems possible 
in terms of reducing costs and staff numbers dedicated to implementation of monetary 
policy; 
4. While there is no evidence of overstaffing at the ECB, some NCBs have higher staff 
numbers than the size of their jurisdiction would imply. 
On simplicity: 
1. The implementation modalities of the Eurosystem are intrinsically complex, because 
of its decentralised set-up, as required by the EU Treaty;  
2. However, a simplification of asset purchase operations could be achieved. For 
instance: 
i. Basing the sharing of purchases between NCBs on objective and functional 
criteria,  
ii. Achieving further specialisation in the purchase operations. 
iii. Giving a greater role to the ECB. 
 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 20 PE 607.341 
REFERENCES 
• Annual reports of all euro area’s national central banks. 
• Annual reports of the European Central Bank. 
• Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016), The Federal Reserve System 
- Purposes & Functions, Federal Reserve System Publication. 
• Claeys, Leandro and Mandra (2015), European Central Bank Quantitative Easing: The 
Detailed Manual, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2015/02 March 2015. 
• Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), Central Bank Transparency: where, why, and with what 
effects?, NBER Working Paper, No. 13003. 
• ECB (2014), Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the European Central Bank. 
• ECB (2017a), More details on the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) - Questions 
& answers, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html, 
accessed August 2017. 
• ECB (2017b), Monetary policy instruments, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/operational/html/index.en.html, accessed 
August 2017. 
• Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), How transparent are central banks?, European Journal of 
Political Economy, Volume 22, Issue 1. 
• Financial Times (2016), Bank chief executives’ pay 2016, https://ig.ft.com/bank-ceo-
pay/2017/?mhq5j=e4, accessed August 2017. 
• Geraats (2001), Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts, 
CEPR Discussion Paper 2582. 
• Papadia (2015), ANFA or a perfect storm in a cup of tea, http://moneymatters-
monetarypolicy.eu/anfa-or-a-perfect-storm-in-a-cup-of-tea/, accessed August 2017  
• Website of the ECB. 
 

